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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The writ of garnishment which is the subject of this appeal was filed in 
a divorce proceeding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals by 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(h)(2005). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred by finding that the Acceptance of 
Inheritance and General Release Plaintiff signed in favor of the Trustee, 
upon Plaintiff's receipt of a bequest to her from the Trust, bars her from 
garnishing funds held by the same Trustee for the benefit of the 
judgment debtor for an unrelated claim for child support. 
Standard of Review: A release is construed under contract principles. 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ~ 9, 48 P.3d 941. The 
interpretation of a contract is a question of law. The trial court's legal 
conclusions regarding a contract we given no deference and are reviewed for 
correctness. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., 1999 UT 69, ~ 6, 983 P.2d 575. 
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Preserved for review: This issue was preserved for rev1ew m the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Response to 
Motion to Quash Garnishment. (R. p. 85)1 
II. Whether the trial court erred by relying on the spendthrift 
provision of the Trust to deny Plaintiff's motion under Rule 59(a)(7). 
Standard of Review: The decision of a trial court to deny a motion for new 
trial is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Hart v. Salt Lake 
County Comm., 945 P.2d 125, 135 (Utah App. 1997). Conclusions of law are 
reviewed for correctness. !d. at 132. In the present case, the trial court relied 
on a conclusion of law to deny the motion. This conclusion of law should be 
reviewed for correctness. 
Preserved for review: This issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs 
Reply to Garnishee's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Pursuant to Rule 
59(a)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing 
Writ of Garnishment. (R. p. 11 0). 
1 The following abbreviation is used: R. for Record. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is an appeal from the Order Granting Motion to Quash 
entered by the Third District Judicial Court and from the subsequent Order 
Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(A)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial 
on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of Garnishment. (R. pp. 107, 158) 
B. Course of proceedings. 
Plaintiff served a writ of garnishment dn the Trustee of the 
Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust. [Hereinafter "Trustee"]. Trustee filed a 
Motion to Quash Writ of Garnishment and a memorandum in support thereof. 
(R. p. 59). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities in Support 
of Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Quash Garnishment. (R. p. 85) Trustee 
filed a Reply to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Quash Garnishmeht. (R. p. 93 ). After 
hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court, in a minute entry dated August 2, 
2004, granted Trustee's motion and quashed the garnishment. (R. p. 104). An 
Order Granting Motion to Quash was filed September 10, 2004. (R. p. 107). 
Plaintiff filed a Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) for Reconsideration or New 
Trial on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of Garnishment and a supporting 
memorandum. (R. p. 110). Garnishee filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs 
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Motion. (R. p. 121). Plaintiff filed a Reply to Garnishee's Opposition. (R. p. 
142). 
C. Disposition in the court below: 
The trial court entered an Order Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 
59(A)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing 
Writ of Garnishment. (R. p. 158). Plaintiff then filed her Notice of Appeal. 
(R. p. 161). 
D. Statement of relevant f~cts: 
Plaintiff divorced John W. Booth, defendant, on January 26, 1988. (R. 
p. 12). The decree of divorce directed Defendant to pay child support, which 
he has not done. (R. p. 12). Plaintiff holds an unsatisfied judgment against 
Defendant for child support in the amount of$22, 115.05, plus interest. (R. p. 
55). Garnishee, who is Defendant's brother, is trustee of a trust created by 
their deceased mother, Charlotte Brown Booth. (R. p. 70). Charlotte Booth 
died on December 2, 2002, and the Trust terminated as provided in paragraph 
13 thereof, whereupon the beneficiaries under the Trust became entitled to 
payment of all gifts made therein. (R. p. 75). Charlotte Booth made a gift to 
Plaintiff in the Trust. (R. p. 86). When Trustee paid that gift to Plaintiff, he 
requested and received a document entitled "Acceptance of Inheritance and 
General Release." [Hereinafter "Acceptance of Inheritance"]. (R. p. 68). 
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Charlotte Booth also made a gift to Defendant in the Trust, but he cannot be 
located, and payment has not been made to him. (R. p. 1 7). Trustee 
continues to hold funds belonging to Defendant. Plaintiff filed a writ of 
garnishment seeking to recover money belonging to Defendant, but still held 
by Trustee. (R. p. 58). Trustee moved to quash the garnishment. (R. p. 59). 
From the subsequent litigation this appeal ensues. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGuMENT 
This case hinges on two questions. First, whether a release given in 
connection with a particular matter can be construed so broadly as to prevent 
a writ of garnishment directed to the releasee seeking funds of a third party in 
a wholly unrelated matter. The second question is whether the spendthrift 
provision of a trust is sufficient to shield the beneficiary's funds against a 
judgment for unpaid child support once the beneficiary is entitled to be paid 
the funds. 
The Acceptance of Inheritance purported to release the Trust and 
Trustee from "all liability, claim, or demand." A garnishment is none of these. 
The garnishee is a stakeholder and a mere depository with no claim to the 
property. Ordinarily a stakeholder is not even considered a real party in 
interest in court proceedings. A garnishment proceeding is merely a 
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component of the due administration of justice. A release is intended to end a 
controversy, to foreclose further claims, or to protect from liability. None of 
these purposes is served by expanding the breadth of its protection to prevent 
a gamishor from obtaining funds due a third party. 
Further, the general rule is that a release that contains both words of 
general release and references to a particular matter is limited to the specific 
controversy. The Acceptance of Inheritance contains reference to the faithful 
performance of the Trustee's duties. Clearly, the contemplation of the parties 
was to release him and the Trust from any claims related to the amount of 
distribution to the Plaintiff and from any claims of failure to properly perform 
the duties of the Trustee. 
The trial court relied on the spendthrift provision of the trust to quash 
the garnishment. Although Utah certainly recognizes spendthrift trusts, they 
are not inviolate. Courts generally recognize that, absent language in the trust 
to prevent such treatment, once a beneficiary becomes entitled to receive 
funds from a trust they may be attached before he receives them. This is 
consistent with the public policy that a person may not tie up his own 
property in such a way that he can enjoy it but so that a creditor may not reach 
it. The Defendant may not simply leave funds to which he is immediately 
entitled within a spendthrift trust and retain the protection of the trust. 
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Section 75-7-506 of the Utah Code Annotated permits a creditor to 
reach a spendthrift trust when the trustee has not made a distribution within a 
reasonable time. The trial court determined that the proceeds could not be 
distributed until the beneficiary was presumed dead. This delay of five years 
constitutes far more than a reasonable delay. 
Competing public policies meet when a judgment for unpaid child 
support is presented with a spendthrift trust. The court must balance the right 
of the settlor to dispose of his property as he pleases against the decided 
pdlicy in favor of enforcement of obligations for child support and alimony. 
The prevailing view is that proceeds of a spendthrift trust may be used to 
satisfy claims for child support. By statute Utah adopts this view. Section 
75-7-503 specifically permits the holder of a judgment for child support to 
obtain an order attaching present or future distributions to the beneficiary. 
Neither the words of general release found in the Acceptance of 
Inheritance nor the provisions of the spendthrift trust provide sufficient basis 
for the trial court to quash the writ of garnishment against the Trustee. 
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ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Whether the trial court erred by finding that the 
Acceptance of Inheritance and General Release Plaintiff signed in favor 
of the Trustee, upon Plaintiffs receipt of a bequest to her from the Trust, 
bars her from garnishing funds held by the same Trustee for the benefit 
of the judgment debtor for an unrelated claim for child support. 
a. A garnishment does not constitute a "liability, claim or demand" 
within the meaning of the release. 
The Trustee asserts the novel defense that the "Acceptance of 
Inheritance and General Release" that Joan B. Booth, Plaintiff, signed before 
delivery of funds to which she was rightfully entitled now somehow bars her 
from garnishing funds that the trustee holds for John W. Booth, Defendant. 
Such an assertion substantially misapprehends the nature and purpose of 
garnishment proceedings. 
The question of whether a general release extends to a garnishment 
action or any action involving a disinterested stakeholder on an unrelated 
matter is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. Similarly, no other 
jurisdiction appears to have considered this issue. 
A two part inquiry is appropriate. First, whether the language of the 
Acceptance of Inheritance which purports to release the Trust and the Trustee 
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"from any and all liability, claim or demand whatsoever" extends to a 
garnishment action. Secondly, whether language of "general release" 
contained within a document extends beyond the subject matter of the 
document. 
Garnishment allows a judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment by 
reaching property owed to the judgment debtor by a third party. Whitney v. 
Faulkner, 2004 UT 52,~ 18, 95 P.3d 270. Through garnishment proceedings, 
the garnishee's debt to the judgment debtor becomes due to the judgment 
creditor. Id The garnishee is typically a neutral party in the garnishment 
proceedings. /d. 
A garnishment proceeding is, in essence, an action by the judgment 
debtor for the benefit of a judgment creditor which is brought against a third 
party, the garnishee, who holds the assets of the judgment debtor. Parkville 
Fed. Sav. Bank v. Maryland Nat'/ Bank, 343 Md. 412, 681 A.2d 521 (Md. 
App. 1996). 
The Trustee, as a garnishee defendant, is merely a stakeholder. 
Henderson & Johnson v. Hooper Sugar Co., 65 Utah 241, 248, 236 P.239, 
241 (1925). "A stakeholder is one who is a mere depositary of property in 
which he has no interest and to which he makes no claim, which he admits 
belongs to one or the other of rival claimants, and as to which he has only the 
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naked authority to deliver to one or the other on the happening or 
nonhappening of a certain contingency." Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 
436, 448; 131 N.E.2d 721, 728 (1956)(1. Desmond dissenting). 
A stakeholder is not ordinarily seen as a real party in interest. Judge 
Posner referred to garnishees and other stakeholders as nominal defendants. 
Matchett v. Wold, 818 F. 2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1987). 
The federal courts have considered whether a garnishee was in a legal 
sense actually subject to a claim. In Armstrong Cover Co. v. Whitfield, 418 F. 
Supp. 972, 973 (N.D. Ga. 1976) the court considered whether the U.S. Postal 
Service could remove a garnishment matter to federal court. The district 
court reasoned that only a defendant could remove a case to federal court. ld. 
Further, the question of whether the Postal Service was a defendant did not 
tum on its designation as such in the garnishment proceedings. Jd. 
Ultimately, the district court concluded that a garnishee was a nominal party. 
I d. at 974. Citing Moore's Federal Practice, the court ultimately held that a 
garnishee is not a defendant entitled to remove an action to federal court. !d. 
The effect of a garnishment is to make the garnishee the trustee of the 
funds of the defendant. Continental Nat'/ Bank v. Tavourmina, 10 F.3d 761, 
764 (11th Cir. 1993). The garnishee has no liability to the garnishor unless a 
valid judgment is entered against him. Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist. v. 
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Continental Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 93 Utah 325, 335; 72 P.2d 1048, 1053 
( 193 7). The garnishee is a stranger to the principal case and an involuntary 
participant in the garnishment proceedings. Pangea Technologies, Inc. v. 
Internet Promotions, Inc, 2004 UT 40, ~ 6, 94 P.3d 257. Similarly, the issuer 
of a garnishment simply stands in the shoes of and is subrogated to the rights 
of the creditor. Lang v. Lang, 17 Utah 2d 10, 12; 403 P.2d 655, 656 (1965). 
Every garnishee is necessarily put to some inconvenience, and perhaps, 
may be put to some expense, in complying with the order of the court. West 
Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, 336; 190 P. 946, 949 (1920). 
In West Cache Sugar Co. a bank resisted a garnishment order that directed 
that a safety deposit box be opened, claiming that the box would be damaged. 
West Cache Sugar Co., 56 Utah at 333. The Court rejected this claim of 
inconvenience saying, "Such matters are too trivial, however, to be urged as a 
means of arresting or impeding the due administration of justice." Jd. at p. 
336. 
No claim is made against the Trustee. Rather, claim is made against 
the funds he holds for John W. Booth. Clearly, as a mere stakeholder, the 
Trustee was not subjected to liability by the garnishment. Neither was any 
claim or demand upon him in a legal sense, beyond that which might be 
required of any citizen who holds the funds of another. Neither he nor the 
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Trust is made subject to a claim, liability, or demand in a legal sense 
sufficient to invoke the words of general release granted in a matter unrelated 
to the garnishment action. 
b. The language of "general release" contained within a document 
does not extend beyond the subject matter of the document. 
(1) The purpose of the release is not served by barring a 
garnishment action. 
The scope of a release may best be determined by looking to the 
purpose of the release. Various pronouncements have been made by courts in 
this regard. It has been held that the purpose of a release is to put an end to 
the matter in controversy. See Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 
812 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Another court has held that the 
purpose is to foreclose further claims. See Zollman v. Geneva Leasing 
Assocs., 780 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind. App. 2002). Perhaps the broadest 
interpretation was provided in Farner v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 
551, 555 (lOth Cir. 1984) where the court stated, "The purpose of a release is 
to protect against liability .... " 
From these cases it can be seen that the broadest reasonable purpose for 
a release is to protect against liability. However, a garnishee has no liability 
absent a judgment against him. Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist., 93 Utah at 
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335; 72 P.2d at 1053. Thus the broadest purpose of a release does not extend 
to garnishment actions. 
(2). A release containing references to tioth a specific 
controversy and wotds of general release is limited to tbe specific matter 
mentioned. 
At common law a release directed to a specitic controversy but which 
included words of general release was limited to the specific claims. Judge 
Learned Hand wrote for the court in Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising 
Co., Inc., 171 F.2d 487 (2nd Cir. 1948). In Vines a document released "all 
claims and demands of any kind whatsoever to the date hereof, and 
particularly ... any claims for salary, commissions or other compensations .... " 
Vines, 171 F .2d at 492. The Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "the courts 
of New York accept the common law doctrine that in a release words of 
general import, followed or preceded by words relating to specific claims, are, 
ceteris paribus, limited to the specific claims." /d. Thus a claim under the 
Anti-Trust Acts was allowed to proceed. /d. 
A similar result was reached in Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co., 442 
N.E.2d 1362 (Ill. App. 1982). In Whitehead a garnishee insurance company 
claimed that words of general release protected it, the excess insurer, from 
liability. /d. at 1365. The court rejected this contention by stating, 
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I d. 
"Although the release is couched in language normally found in 
general releases, we cannot accept garnishee's construction. 
Under Illinois law, when an instrument contains recitals of, or 
other references to, specific claims and also words of general 
release, the words of general release are limited to the particular 
claim to which reference is made. " 
Certainly Utah courts have considered challenges to releases. Releases 
have been upheld when injuries or damages were greater than the claimant 
had anticipated. See Carter v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Utah 
1976)(upholding release where there were unknown consequences from a 
known injury); see also American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical, 930 
P.2d 1182, 1187 (Utah 1996)(upheld release where some problems unknown 
when release was executed). Each instance in which the release was upheld 
was in connection with a greater or additional claim arising out of the 
circumstances that gave rise to release in the first place. This does not 
suggest that Utah did not adopt the common law rule explained by Judge 
Hand in Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. 
Rather, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d 
999 (Utah 1986), 
"Courts of equity will restrict a general release to the thing or 
things intended to be released. As on a release of all demands, 
when some particular demand was in view, the court of chancery 
will not allow the releasee to take advantage of the general words 
to defeat the collection of a demand not then in the minds of the 
parties." 
19 
!d. at 1 002.( quoting 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release §55). 
This is precisely in line with the common law rule that mention of a 
specific matter in a release limits the application of general terms of release to 
that specific matter. The Acceptance of Inheritance refers both to the fact that 
the Trustee acted with fidelity, diligence and integrity in administering the 
trust and that the amount received was the correct and appropriate amount. 
Clearly, the contemplation of the parties was that Plaintiff was releasing all 
claims against the Trustee for failure to perform his duties properly or for 
failure to deliver the correct sum to Plaintiff. It would be unjust to permit 
general terms of release to be so far extended in their application that they 
protect, not the Trustee, but rather a judgment debtor against a lawful 
collection effort. 
Issue 11. Whether the trial court erted by relying on the spendthrift 
provision of the trust to quash the writ of garnishment. 
In its Order Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(A)(7) For 
Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of 
Garnishment the trial court determined that "its prior ruling was appropriate 
in lieu (sic) of the Trust's spendthrift trust provision and the fact that the 
distribution to defendant has not yet occurred." 
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In its ruling the trial court relied on the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§75-7-502. The statute states as follows: 
" Spendthrift provisions for beneficiaries other than the settlor 
( 1) A spendthrift provision for a beneficiary other than the 
settlor is valid only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary 
transfer of a beneficiary's interest, even if the beneficiary is the 
trustee or cotrustee of the trust. 
(2) A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary 
other than the settlor is held subject to a "spendthrift trust," or 
words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both voluntary 
and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's interest. 
(3) A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in 
violation of a valid spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise 
provided in this part, a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary 
may not reach the interest or a distribution by the trustee before 
its receipt by the beneficiary." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-502 (2005). 
Three factors serve to render the application of §75-7-502 an 
insufficient basis upon which to quash a writ of garnishment. First, by its 
terms, the trust terminated on the settlor's death and the defendant's right to 
distribution therefrom has fully matured, thus the spendthrift provision was no 
longer applicable. {Trust ~13 , ~ll(b), pages XI and XIII of Addendum). 
Secondly, Utah statutes permit a creditor to reach such a distribution if not 
made to the beneficiary within a reasonable time. Finally, statutes permit 
attachment of assets within a spendthrift trust for unpaid child support. 
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a. Spendthrift provisions of the Trust became inapplicable once 
the Defendant was entitled to claim the funds. 
The settlor died prior to execution of the Acceptance of Inheritance on 
February 14, 2003. (R. p. 86) At the time of the trial court's ruling the settlor 
had been dead nearly two years. Paragraph 13 of the Trust states in the 
applicable portion, "Except as provided in the Trust with reference to the 
Support and Maintenance of Disabled Children, this Trust shall terminate 
upon the death of Settlor."( Trust ~13, page XIII of Addendum). Thus, by its 
terms the Trust, and its relevant spendthrift provisions, was terminated at the 
time the writ of garnishment was executed. 
Although it may be argued that the Trust, itself, does not terminate 
immediately upon the death of the settlor, cases hold that the spendthrift 
provision became inapplicable on that day. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered circumstances 
substantially identical to those in the case sub judice. In Sproul-Bolton v. 
Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. 85, 87; 117 A.2d 688, 689 (1955) a defendant was 
eligible on his thirtieth birthday to receive a distribution from a trust which 
contained a spendthrift clause. The defendant's whereabouts were unknown. 
/d. Immediately following the defendant's thirtieth birthday the plaintiff 
served a writ of attachment on the trustee seeking to attach the defendant's 
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share in the trust. Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 88; 117 A.2d at 690. The trustee 
filed objections to the writ. !d. The sole question presented to the court was 
whether the corpus of the spendthrift trust was immune from attachment by a 
creditor of the beneficiary after the latter became entitled to receive it but 
before it had been paid to him by the trustee. Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 87; 
117 A.2d at 689. 
The Sproul-Bolton court noted that in each case cited by the garnishee 
in support of continued immunity the trust in question contained an express 
provision granting such immunity. Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 91; 117 A.2d at 
691. The court concluded that, 
"the general conclusion to be derived from them [the cases cited] 
is, as already stated, that ordinarily the principal of a trust fund, 
the right and title to which has vested in the beneficiary and 
which has become payable to him, is subject to attachment by his 
creditors, and that it is only when the donor or testator who 
created the trust has by clear language expressed the intention 
that the immunity from attachment or alienation is to continue 
until actual payment of the principal to the beneficiary that such 
protection in transit will be accorded legal support." 
Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 93; 117 A.2d at 692. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reached a substantially identical 
decision in Brent v. State Cent. Collection Unit, 311 Md. 626, 537 A.2d 227 
(Md. App. 1988). In Brent the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust was entitled to 
demand payment but, because of his incompetency had not done so. Brent at, 
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311 Md. at 628; 537 A.2d at 228. A garnishment was filed and the garnishee 
objected. !d. The court noted that a substantial number of states had 
considered the question and found the following as a statement of policy 
found within those cases: 
"[i]t is tmiformly held to be against public policy to permit a 
person to tie up his own property in such a way that he can still 
enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching it." 
Brent at, 311 Md. at 634; 537 A.2d at 231. 
Further, the court reasoned that key is the right of the beneficiary to the 
corpus as distinguished from his actual possession of it. !d. Thus the 
garnishment was proper. Brent at, 311 Md. at 642; 537 A.2d at 234. 
John W. Booth had a right to obtain his share of the Trust funds upon 
the death of the settlor. It would be unreasonable to permit the Trustee to 
protect funds to which John W. Booth was entitled, when Mr. Booth would 
not be so entitled were the funds in his possession. 
b. The trial court permitted more than a reasonable time for distribution 
of the proceeds of the Trust. 
The Order Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 59( A) stated that after five 
years without contact the Defendant will be presumed dead and the trust 
proceeds distributed. (R. p. 159, page V of Addendum). Reliance was 
apparently placed on Utah Code Ann. §75-1-107(e) which states: 
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(e) An individual whose death is not established under 
Subsection (l)(a), (b), (c), or (d) who is absent for a continuous 
period of five years, during which the individual has not been 
heard from, and whose absence is not satisfactorily explained 
after diligent search or inquiry, is presumed to be dead. The 
individual's death is presumed to have occurred at the end of the 
period unless there is sufficient evidence for determining that 
death occurred earlier. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-1 07( e )(2005). 
More appropriate would be reliance upon Utah Code Ann. §75-7-506, 
which governs such a distribution. This statute states as follows: 
"Overdue distribution 
Whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a 
creditor or assignee of a beneficiary may reach a mandatory 
distribution of income or principal, including a distribution upon 
termination of the trust, if the trustee has not made the 
distribution to the beneficiary within a reasonable time after the 
required distribution date." 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-506 (2005). 
The relevant question then hinges on what constitutes a "reasonable 
time." Unfortunately, no authority was located for guidance in determining 
what period of time might be reasonable under the facts of this case. 
However, the trust funds have now been eligible for distribution to John W. 
Booth for more than two years. The trial court gave no rationale for delaying 
distribution for five years other than at that time Mr. Booth will be presumed 
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dead pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-1-107(e). (R. p. 159). Plaintiff urges 
that this is an insufficient basis for delay in ordering distribution. 
c. Public policy favors disregard of spendthrift provisions when 
necessary to collect support. 
The Restatement (Second) ofTrust § 157(a)(1959) provides: 
"Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the 
interest of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an 
enforceable claim against the beneficiary, 
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the 
wife for alimony." 
This view has been adopted by many jurisdictions. Two competing 
interests of public policy arise in such a situation. The court must balance the 
right of a settlor to dispose of his property as he pleases against the decided 
policy in favor of the enforcement of obligations for child support and 
alimony. Council v. Owens, 28 Ark. App. 49, 53; 770 S.W. 2d 193, 196 
(1989). The claim of a wife and dependent children to support is based upon 
the clearest grounds of public policy. They are in quite a different position 
from ordinary creditors who have voluntarily extended credit. !d. The 
prevailing view is that the income distributable from a spendthrift trust can be 
reached to satisfy claims for unpaid child support and alimony, in the absence 
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of a state statute to the contrary. Council, 28 Ark. App. at 52; 770 S.W. 2d at 
196. 
Rather than a statute to the contrary, Utah has a statute specifically 
authorizing such attachment. Section 75-7-503 specifically permits the 
holder judgment for child support to obtain a court order attaching present or 
future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary. It states as follows: 
Exceptions to spendthrift provision 
(1) In this section, "child" includes any person for whom an 
order or judgment for child support has been entered in this or 
another state. 
(2) Even if a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a beneficiary's 
child who has a judgment or court order against the beneficiary 
for support or maintenance, or a judgment creditor who has 
provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's interest in 
the trust, may obtain from a court an order attaching present or 
future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary. 
(3) A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against a claim of 
this state or the United States to the extent a statute of this state 
or federal law so provides. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-503 (2005). 
The public policy of Utah clearly envisions the superiority of a claim 
for child support over the competing interests protected by a spendthrift trust. 
Although sound legal authority supports the argument that the spendthrift 
provision of the Trust is no longer viable, should this Court determine 
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otherwise, Plaintiff should still be permitted to collect her judgment for 
unpaid child support. 
The practical effect of affirming the decision of the trial court may well 
be to permit the absconding debtor to return and collect from the Trustee 
funds rightfully owed for support of the defendant's children and then to 
depart once again for places unknown. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited, the Order Granting Motion To Quash entered by 
the Third District Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRIC': COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JO).Ul B. BOOTE, 
Pla1ntiff, MINUTE ENTRY 
v. CASE NO. 874902929 
RECBVED 
AUG itt,- liM 
JOHN W. BOOTH, JUPGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Defendants. 
Oral arguments on the "Trustee's Motion To Quash The Writ of, 
G,arnishntent" were heard on July 12, 2004. At the conclusion o.f 
arguments, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
Now, upon further cons~deration, che Court hereby grants the 
TrUstee's mot2on and quas~es :he wr1t of garnishment. This ruling 
i~ based, in part, upon plaintiff's execution of an "Accep~anoe of< 
-Inheritance and General Release." specifically, in that docume~ 
dated February 14, 2004, plaintiff released both the trust and-
t:ru.stee from "any and all" future claims and liability. 
By law, afteY f1ve years w1thout contact, ~he ce:er~ant will 
.be presumed deceased and the trust shall be distributed .• ecr 
' 
de£endant's ch~ldren per stirpes. 
The Trustee's counsel is requested to prepare an Order 
consistent w~tt ttis M~~ute E~try, for sub~~ssion to the Court. 
I 
BOOTH V. BOOTH PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Dated this day of 1::1: ~4. 
----
BY THE COURT: 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
~!STRICT COURT JUDGE 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 1 ~ 2tJJit 
E UNTY 
By - ~ DePUtYCiet~c Rick L. Sorensen (7631) 
HAWKINS & SoRENsEN, LC 
Centennial Plaza, Suite 309 RECEIVED 
45 West 10000 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 SEP 1 j ., 
Telephone: (801) 233-0031 
Facsimile: (80 I) 233-0032 
Attorneys for Brent Theodbre Booth. Trustee of the Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN B. BOOTH. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
JOHN W. BOOTH, 
Defendant. 
BRENT THEODORE BOOTH, TRUSTEE 
OF THE CHARLOTTE BOOTH 
REVOCABLE TRUST, 
Garnishee. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
QUASH 
Civil No D-87-0-2929 
This matter came on for heanng on a .\1otion to Quash \\tnt ofGam1shment filed by Brent 
Theodore Booth. Trustee of the Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust (hereinafter -Trustee} on Ju1y 
' 
12.2004. The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presided at the hearing. Rick L Sorensen 
.represented Trustee and Russell M. Blood represented Plaintiff Joan B Booth. The Court, 
having reviewed the memoranda submitted by both parties, and having heard the arguments by 
counsel, hereby 
ORDERS, DECREES and ADJUDGES as follows: 
1. Trustee's Motion to Quash is granted and the Writ of Garnishment is quashed 
2. Pursuant to section 75-l-101(e) of the Utah Code, Defendant will be presumed 
dead after 5 years without contact andthe-ttust-sballabe ~ Qefendant.!g.dHidren.per. 
stirpes after the five year period. 
DATEDthis L(' dayof ~ .2004. 
Approved as to form 
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BYTHECOURT 
/] 
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
Thjrd District Judicial Court Jud 
--~~ 
MAR-03-2005 THU 01:38PM CRitnrNAL DEPT 
Rick L. Sorensen (7631) 
HA WKJNS & SORENSEN, LC 
CentenrUal Plaza, Suite 309 
45 West 10000 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 233·0031 
Facsimile: (801) 233-0032 
FAX NO. 80l23Br564 P. 02 
F .. IIITIIOTCGUIJ 
Thfrd Judlc(al District 
Altorneysj()r Brenl Theod<Jre Booth. Trustee ojrhe Chatlotte Booth Revocable Trust 
JN THE THIRD DISTRJCT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNT\', STATI OF UTAH 
JOAN B. BOOTH, 
Plainti:ff, 
v. 
JOHN W. BOOTH, 
Defendant, 
BRENT THEODO~ BOOTH, TRUSTEE 
OF THE CHARLOTIE BOOTH 
REVOCABLE TRUST, 
Garnishee. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 59(A)(7) FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR NEW 
TRIAL ON THE COURT'S ORDER 
QUASIDNG WRIT OF 
GARNISHMENT 
CivU No. D-87·0·2929 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter came on for hearins on Dc:cembcr 29, 2004, on Plaintiff's Motion PurSlWlt to 
Rule S9(a)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of 
Gamisbment (hereinafter "Piaint.Urs Motion"). The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presided at 
the hearing. Rick L. Soreusen represented Trustee Brent Theodore Booth (hereinafter "Trustee") 
and Russell M Blood represented Plaintift' Joan B. Booth. The Court, having reviewed the 
memol'lUlda submitted by both parties, and having heard the argumentS by counsel, hereby 
MAR-03-2005 THU 01:38PM CRIMINAL DEPT FAX NO. 80123afb64 P. 03 
ORDERS, DECUES and ADJUDGES as follows: 
On August 2, 2004, in a Minute Entry, this Court granted Trustee's motion to quash the 
writ of garnishment bccaWIC: (1) plainti1frelcased the Trust from any IU'ld aU future claims of 
liability pliJ'SUant to the execution of an ''Acceptance of Inheritance & General Release;" and (b) 
by law after five years the defeudant will be presumed deceased and the money will go to 
decedent's children per stirpes. PJaintitfmoved the Court to reconsider its prior ruling. 
In order to grant the Motion For Reconsideration. the Court must cQnclude that its prior 
Minute Entry e:ntered August 2, 2004, was incorrect, ic. that the tc:lm$ of the General Release are 
limited and only effect plaintiff's right to payment as bePeticiary oftbe Trust- not her claims 
against her ex-husband for child SUppOrt. 
The Court, however, determines that its prior ruling was appropriate in lieu oftbe Trust's 
spendthrift tiust provision and tbc ial;t that the distribution to defendant has not yet occurred. See 
Utah Code Ann.§ 15·1·502. 
DATIID Ibis ...JfL day of ~ , 200S. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as lo form: 
Russell M Blood 
Attorney for Plaintiff Joan B. Booth 
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ACCEPTANCE OF INHERITANCE 
AND 
GENERAL RELEASE 
In consideration of 2 5:/'t ?,/IJ received by me this day and other consideration, 
the value and receipt of which~ hereby acknowledged, 1: 
1. Acknowledge that :atent. Theodore Booth bas acted with fidelity, diligence 
and integrity in administering the Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust; 
2. Acknowledge and accept the amount stated above as the correct and 
appropriate amount due me under the terms of the Trust; 
3. By my signature below, covenant not to sue the Charlotte Booth Revocable 
Trust or its Trustee, Brent Theodore Booth, and agree that this document shall 
serve as a "General Release" of the Trust and Trustee named from any and all 
liability, claim or demand whatsoever; and 
4. I agree and covenant to hold the above Trust and Trustee harmless and 
indemnify them fully, including attorneys fees. 
Dated this P/ day of &.6 · , 20t13. 
Print~hl 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this A day of__.;;,;:...41/b~~· __ ___., 20/E2_, 
by tJJJ?rr.J P . &OTH 
810104 
DECLARATION OFTlWST AND AGREEMENT 
1HIS DECLARATION OF TRUST AND AGREEMENT made this J_l_ 
day of~ t'Jfif, between CH.ARL01TE BROWN BOOm of West Jordan, 
Utah, hereinafter NCharlotte Brown Booth" Ol" "Settlor" and Charlotte Brown Booth 
of West Jord.an, Utah, hereinafter referred to a;; 'lrustee". 
The initial pages of this Trust document are referred to as "general 
provisions." Incorporated into this document are certain "technical provisions". 
To the extent that the general provisions of this Trust are inconsistent with the 
technical provisions, the technical proyisions shall in every instance govern the 
construction, interpretation, and operatipn of the Trust. Accordingly, the 
dispositive provisions of these "general provisi()dS" are intended only to give a brief 
outline of some of the important provisions of this Trust. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. Name Qf Trust. This Trust shall be known as the "Charlotte . 
Booth Revocable Trust" 
2. Statement as to Family. Settlor is widowed. Settlor's children 
now living are as follows: 
Name 
John Wilford Booth 
Kathleen Hansen 
Brent Theodore Booth 
Charleen Packer 
Stephen Page Booth 
Carol Koller 
Date of Birth 
Novembel' 9, 1940 
September 25, 1942 
February 25,1945 
October 30, 1947 
Deceased 
December 25, 1951 
Settlor intends the provisions of this Trust to apply to such children as well as any 
children subsequently bom to or legally adopted by Settlor. Trustee may rely on 
such dates of birth for any purpose. 
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3. General SdJeme of DispoBtion Jlp.pn DeatiJ. Upon the death of 
the Settlor the Trust Estate shall be distributed to Settlor's children in equal shares, 
per stirpes. 
4.. Trustee Provisions 
A. Appointmen$. The Settlor hereby appoints and 
nominates Charlotte Brown Booth, of West Jordan, Utah, as Trustee of the Trust 
created hereunder. 
B. Succ;essor T{Ustec· If the Trustee hereinbefore named 
should fail or cease to serve for any reason, then I appoint any one of the persons 
and/or institutions hereinafter named to serve as Trustee, my preference in their 
appointment being in the order named: 
1. Brent Theodore Booth, of Riverton, Utah 
2. Charleen Packer, of Draper, Utah 
5. Revocable Natgre, of Tt,US.t- During Settlor's lifetime this Trust 
can be amended or revoked in whole or in part at any time by the Settlor. 
TECHNICAL PROVISIONS 
6. Trust Estate. Simultaneously with the execution of this 
Declaration of Trust and Agreementr the Settlor does hereby gratuitously transfer to 
the Trustee (without any consideration therefor) Settlor's entire right, title and 
imelest in and to the assets more fully desaibed in Schedule • A • and does hereby 
name the Trustee as beneficiaty of the insu1'ance polides or employee benefit plans 
listed on Schedule "'8•, which schedules ate attached hereto and by this reference 
made a part hereof. The assets listed on Schedule • A" and the proceeds received 
from the insurance policies or employee benefit plans listed on Schedule "B" and all 
other property which may be received by the Trustee hereunder shall constitute the 
Trust :Estate of this Trust and shall be held, managed and distributed as hereinafter 
provided. The transfers and designations hereby made shall be deemed effective 
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immediately upon the execution of this Agreement even tnoug..n 111rt.her 
ministerial acts may be necessary to effect the changes in the records of the issuers of 
the policies. The Trustee acknowledges receipt of the assets listed on Schedule "A" 
and the designation as beneficiary of the policies or employee benefit plans listed on 
Schedule "B". 
7. Children and Adoption. Settlor intends the provisions of this 
Trust to apply to Settlor's children living at the time of the execution of this Trust, 
as hereinbefore set forth, as well as any children subsequently hom to or legally 
adopted by Settlor. 
8. Bight§ Reserved by Settlor. While not under any legal disability, 
Settlor reserves the right to amend or revoke the Trust under this Agreement, in 
whole or in part, at any time or times, by a writing delivered to Trustee during 
Settlor's life, and such alteration, amendment, modification or revocation shall be 
effective immediately upon delivery to the Trustee. The Settlor may, by written 
instrument signed and delivered to the Trustee, withdraw any property owned by 
Settlor or policy owned by Settlor without approval or consent of anyone. Upon the 
death of the Settlor, the trusts created herein shall become irrevocable. 
9. J)i&position During Sgttlor'a Life. During Settlor's life, Trustee 
shall pay or apply the net income and principal of the Trust Estate as Settlor may 
direct from time to time, but until otherwise directed, Trustee shall pay the net 
income to the Settlor at least monthly- H in Trustee's sole and absolute judgment, 
Settlor is so incapacitated by reason of illness, age or other cause that the Settlor is 
incapable of expending funds for Settlor's own use and benefit or is unavailable to 
give prompt attention to Settlor's financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of 
the net income and principal of the Trust Estate as Trustee in its sole and absolute 
discretion deems necessary or advisable (i) for the support, maintenance, health, 
comfort and welfare of Settlor, Settlor's children or grandchildren, or any person 
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which, in the sole judgment of Trustee, is dependent upon Settlor, (ii) for the 
payment of premiums on any insurance policies owned by Settlor, whether or not 
subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement, and (iii) for the purpose of discharging 
any obligation incurred by Settlor and believed by Trustee to be a valid debt. Any 
income not so used shall be accumulated and added to principal from time to time. 
10. Additional Property. The Settlor, or any other person may by 
gift, testamentary disposition or otherwise, make additional contributions of cash or 
property to this Trust or may name the Trustee beneficiary on additional insurance 
policies or benefit plans, and when accepted by the Trustee, said property shall be 
administered by the Trustee under the terms and conditions hereof. 
11. Qispositiou Upon Settlor'$ Death ;md IerminatiQn. 
A. Taxes. Qebm. Funeral & Administration Expenm;. Upon 
the death of the Settlor, the Trustee in its discretion may pay to the duly qualified 
personal representative of the Settlor's estate an amount equal to all or part of the 
Settlor's debts and expenses of Settlor's last illness, funeral, burial and the 
administration costs involved in handling the Settlor's estate, together with all 
estate, inheritance, succession or other death taxes, including any penalties and 
interest thereon, which are due by reason of Settlor's death. Written statements by 
the personal representatives of the sums that must be paid shall be sufficient 
evidence of their amounts, and Trustee shall be under no duty to see to the 
application of any such payments. 
B. Disposition Upon Termination. Upon termination, the 
Trustee shall distribute the then remaining principal and all accumulated and 
acaued but undistributed income as follows: 
(i) To Settlor's children in equal shares, per stirpes, to 
be determined by the Trustee. If at the time of the distribution, any child of Settlor is 
deceased with no issue then living, then the share of such child shall be distributed 
equally to Se1tlor' s other children, per stirpes. 
(ii) In the event none of the Settlor's descendants is 
then living or if at any time there is no person or entity qualified to receive final 
distribution of the Trust Estate or any part of it, then any such portion of the Trust 
Estate to which such failure of qualified recipients has occurred shall be distributed 
to the Settlor's heirs at law. 
C Distributions to Minors. If any beneficiary to whom 
Trustee is directed to distribute any share of Trust principal is under the age of 
twenty-one (21) years when the distribution is to be made, Trustee may in its 
discretion continue to hold such beneficiary's share as a separate Trust until he 
reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years, or until the prior expiration of twenty-one 
(21) years after the death of the survivor of Settlor's descendants who were living at 
Settlor's death, when Trustee shall distribute such beneficiazy's share to him. If 
such beneficiary dies before that time, Trustee shall upon his death, distribute his 
share to his then living descendants_, per stirpes, or if none, to his surviving spouse, 
or if none, to the then living descendants, per stirpes, of that parent of the 
beneficiary who was a child of Settlor, or if none,. to Settlor's then living 
descendants, per stirpes. While any Trust is being held under this Paragraph ll(C), 
Trustee may pay to, or apply for the benefit of, the beneficiary for whom the Trust is 
held such amounts of the net income or principal, or both, as Trustee may 
determine to be necessarv or advisable for such beneficiary's suppott maintenance. 
health, and education, after taking into consideration all of the resources known to 
Trustee to be available for such purposes. Any undistributed income may be added 
to principal from time to time in the discretion of Trustee. 
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12. Imnination of Trust. 
Support aruj Maintenance of Disabled Children. Notwithstand-
ing anything herein contained to the contrary, if any of the Settlor's children 
become physically or mentally disabled, and the Trustee in its sole discretion 
determines that such child is unable to support and maintain himself, and this 
Trust would otherwise terminate as provided in Paragraph 13 herein, the Trustee 
shall continue to hold in Trust and reinvest sufficient principal of the Trust for the 
purpose of providing necessary support and maintenance for any such mentally or 
physically disabled child. The amount of principal or income not needed, if any, to 
support a disabled child shall be paid to the beneficiaries of this Trust~ as provided in 
Paragraph ll(B) herein. If, in the sole discretion of the Trustee, a disabled child is 
able to support himself, this Trust shall terminate as provided herein. It is the 
Settlor's intention that a mentally or physically disabled child should receive 
benefits under this Paragraph 12 only if the Trust would otherwise terminate. 
13. Termination- Except as provided in this Trust with reference to 
the Support and Maintenance of Disabled Children, this Trust shall terminate upon 
the death of Settlor. Notwithstanding the above, if any Trust hereunder, in the 
absolute discretion of the Trustee, becomes sufficiently small in value that the 
administration thereof is no longer economically desirable, the cost thereof is 
disproportionate to the value of the assets, or the continuation thereof is no longer 
in the best interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries, the Trustee may terminate 
such Trust. Upon said termioation, the Trustee shall distribute the property of such 
Trust as otherwise provided in this Agreement. 
14. Trust. Admjnhrtrative. and Protective Proyisioll§. 
A. Inalienability and Spendthrift. Except as otherwise 
provided herein, no beneficiary shall have any right to anticipate, sell, assign, 
mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of or encumber all or any part of the Trust 
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Estate nor shall any part of the Trust Estate, including income, be liable for the debts 
or obligations, including alimony, of any beneficiary or be subject to attachment, 
garnishment, execution, creditor's bill~ or other legal or equitable process. 
B. Undistn"buted IncQJDe at Death of Beneficiary. Upon the 
death of any beneficiary entitled to receive income, all accrued or undistributed 
income held for the attotmt of such beneficiary shall be treated as if it had accrued or 
been received immediately following the death of 5Uch beneficiary. 
C Situs of the Trust. The validity of this Trust shall be 
determined under the laws of the State of Utah, United States of America. 
Questions of construction and administration of this Trust shall be determined 
under the laws of the situs of administration. 
D. Protection Against fe}:petui~ Rule •• This Trust shall in 
any event terminate not later than twenty-one {21) years after the death of the last 
survivor of the group composed of Settlor, and those of Settlor's descendants living 
at Settlor's death.. The property held in Trust shall be distributed to the persons then 
entitled to the income, in the proportion in which they are beneficiaries of such 
income, and for this purpose only it shall be presumed that any persons then 
entitled to receive any discretionary payments from the income or principal of any 
particular Trust is entitled to receive the full income, and that any class of persons 
so entitled is entitled to receive all such property, to be divided among them per 
stirpes. No power of appointment granted hereunder shall be so exercised as to 
~late any applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, accumulations or any similar rule 
or law and any attempted exercise of any such power which violates such Rule or 
Law shall be void, notwithstanding any provisions of this Trust to the contrary. 
E. Am>unting. Trustee shall keep and maintain exact and 
proper records reflecting the income, disbu,rsements and principal of the Trust. 
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Annual balance sheets and income statements shall be fumished to each beneficiary 
or to his or her personal representative, if any. 
15. Trqstee Powers. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement 
relating to the powers reserved by the Settlor, the Trustee shall have and exercise 
exclusive management and control of the Trust, and shall be vested with the 
following specific powers and discretion, in addition to the powers as IllClY be 
generally conferred from time to time upon Trustee by Law: 
A. In administering any Trust under this Agreement, 
Trustee may exercise the following powers: to hold, retain, invest, reinvest and 
manage without diversification as to kind, amount or risk of non-productivity in 
realty or personalty and without limitation by statute or rule of law; to partition, 
sell, exchange, grant, convey, deliver, assign, transfer, lease, option, mortgage, 
pledge, abandon, borrow, loan, contract, distribute in cash or kind or partly in each at 
fair market value on the date of distribution and without requiring pro rata 
distribution of specific assets, hold in nominee form, continue businesses, carry out 
agreements, deal with itself, other fiduciaries and business organizations in which 
Trustee may have an interest, establish reserves, release powers and abandon, settle 
or contest claims. 
B. If the situs of administration of the Trust is in Utah, 
Trustee may also exercise all the powers in the Uniform Trustees• Powers 
Provisions of the Utah Unifonn Probate Code as set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 75-7-402, as amended, after the execution of this Agreement and after 
Settlor's death. If the situs of administration of the Trust is outside Utah, Trustee 
may also exercise all the powers in the said provisions which Settlor incorporates in 
this Agreement as the Act exists on the date of this Agreement. Further, the Trustee 
may determine what is principal and what is income of any Trust and apportiop 
and allocate in its discretion its receipts, taxes and other expenses and charges 
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between the two. A separate income account need not be maintained_ Any income 
not distributed in accordance with the provisions hereof shall become principaL 
C. The powers herein granted to the Trustee may be 
exercised in whole or in part, from time to time, and shall be deemed to be 
supplementary to, and not exclusive of, the general powers of Trustees pursuant to 
law, and shaH include ali powers necessary to carry the same into effect. The 
powers, duhes and responsibilities stated h.erein shall not be deemed to exclude 
other implied powers, duties or responsibilities not inconsistent herewith and any 
successor Trustee shall succeed to the same rights, powers, duties and 
responsibilities provided herein as the Trustee hereinbefore named. 
16. Trustee Provisions. 
A. Resignation. Any Trustee may resign by giving thirty (30) 
days \VTitten notice to each adult beneficiary,, or if none, to the guardian, parent or 
other person having the right of custody of each minor beneficiary, then eligible to 
receive current income, effective at the end of said thirty (30) days. 
B. Successor Trustee. If all of the herein named T rustces fail 
or cease to serve or i1Ct as Trustee, a majority in number of the beneficiaries then 
eligible to receive curn. .. -'llt income shall appoint by a \VTiting within thirty (30) days a 
successor Trustee. If no successor Trustee is appointed within thirty {3(}} days, any 
beneficiary may petition ex parte any court of competent jurisdiction to name a 
successor Trustee. By making such appointment, such court shall not acquire 
jurisdiction over the Trust. Any successor Trustee must be a bank organized under 
the laws of any state or of the United States having total assets of at least One 
Hundred Million Dollars and maintaining a fu.ll time Trust department, and 
insured by the Federal Government. 
C Rights of Successor Trustees. Every successor Trustee 
shall haYe all the title, rights, powers, privileges, and duties conferred or imposed 
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upon the original Trustee, without any act of conveyance or transfer. No fiduciary 
need examine the accounts, records and acts of any previous fiduciary or any 
allocation of the Trust Estate nor be responsible fot any act or omission to act on the 
part ot any previous fiductary. 
D. Bonds and Compensation. Settlor, having confidence in the 
Trustee and any successor appointed herein, hereby directs that any Trustee 
hereunder shall serve without giving bond or security and without obtaining any 
order from or approval of any court and without notice to or consent of anyone. 
The Trustee and any successor Trustee shall be entitled to receive a fair and just 
compensation for its services hereunder, as allowed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
17. Jnaur.ance Provi&jona. 
A. Settlor's Right.&. All benefits, rights, privileges, and 
options available to Settlor during Settlor's lifetime as the owner of or the insured 
under the insurance policies Qf which Trustee ,js beneficiary shall be retained by 
Settlor for Settlor's sole benefit regardless of the terms of this Agreement and of the 
fact that the Trustee is named as beneficiary in the policies and shall not be subject to 
, the Trust. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Settlor may exercise any 
right in the policies, including the right to change the beneficiary, surrender, cancel, 
borrow on, or receive dividends from the policies, and make any elections or 
exercise any option granted in such policies, all without notice to or consent by 
Trustee or any beneficiary of tbe Trust. 
B. Payment of Premiums. The Trustee shall be under no 
obligation to pay the premiums which may become due and payable under the 
provisions of any policy of insurance which is an asset of this Trust or to make 
certain that such premiums am paid by the Trustor or others or to notify any person 
of nonpayment of Such premiums, and the Trustee shall be under no responsibility 
or liability of any kind in case such premiums are not paid, except that it may apply 
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any dividends received by it on such policy, or any other Trust assets for the 
payment of premiums thereon. Upon receipt of notice at any time during the 
continuance of this Trust that the premiums due upon such policy are in default or 
that premiums to become due will not be paid, either by the Settlor or by any other 
persons, the Trustee, within its sole discretion, may apply any cash values 
attributable to such policy to the purchase of paid-up insurance or of extended 
insurance or may borrow upon such policy for the payment of the premiums due 
thereon or may accept the cash value of such policy upon its forfeiture. 
C Collection of Proceeds. On Settlor's death, Trustee shall 
collect the proceeds of all the policies of insurance upon Settlor's life and all 
employee death benefits payable to Trustee. Payment to Trustee and the receipt for 
payment by Trustee shall constitute a full release and discharge of the liability of a 
payor and no payor need inquire into or take notice of this instrument or see to the 
application of such payment. Trustee may, and upon being indemnified to its 
satisfaction against all cost and expenses shall litigate as necessary to enforce 
payment of the policies. 
18. Definitions. 
A. Descendants. "Descendants" and/ or "issue" means 
children and other lineal descendants whether natural or adopted. It is intended 
that all adopted children of any person shall be treated as natural and legitimate 
children for all purposes whatsoever, provided that such adoption is by legal 
proceeding before the child's twenty-first {21) birthday. 
B. Per Stirpes. "Per stirpesw means to take, by representation 
strictly construed, the share which a deceased ancestor would have taken had such 
ancestor survived the event specifically named or indicated, with the stirpes or 
stocks being Settlor's children, except that, if all the takers are in equal degree of 
kinship, they shall take per capita. 
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C. ~ A person reaches or attains any specified age (for 
example 25) at the first moment of the day of his or her equivalent birthday (for 
example 25th birthday). A person born on February 29th shall be deemed to have 
been born on February 28th for purposes of this clause. 
D. TnvUee. "Trustee" may be read as "Trustees" and "Trust" 
may be read as "Trusts" in all cases where appropriate, and vice versa. 
E. Pronouns. Number and Gender. The singular shall be 
interpreted as the plural, and vice versa, if such treatment is necessary to interpret 
this Trust in accord with the Settlor's manifest intention. Likewise, if either the 
feminine, masculine, or neuter gender should be one of the other genders, it shall 
be so treated. 
F. Pmgraph Headinp. The paragraph and sub-paragraph 
headings used herein are merely for identification purposes and shall not be 
considered in the interpretation of this Trust. 
19. Lep.l Matters· In all matters concerning the Trusts herein 
established, Settlor suggests that the Trust employ as its attomey Gregory P. Hawkins 
of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
20. Declaration of Settlor. The undersigned Settlor named in the 
foregoing Declaration of Trust does hereby certify that Settlor has read this 
Declaration of Trust and Agreement, and that the same fully and accurately sets out 
the terms, Trusts and conditions under which the Trust Estate therein described is to 
be held, managed and disposed of by the Trustee therein named, and Settlor does 
hereby approve, ratify and confirm this Declaration of Trust and Agreement in all 
particulars. 
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IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, Settlor and Trustee have executed this 
Declaration of Trust and Agreement the day and year first above written. 
SETTLOR: 
~~l?n4v 
Charlotte Brown Booth 
TRUSTEE: 
Charlotte Brown Booth 
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